Abstract. Silicon Valley in California and the Hsinchu-Taipei region of Taiwan are among the most frequently cited 'miracles' of the information technology era. The dominant accounts of these successes treat them in isolation, focusing either on free markets, multinationals or the state. This paper argues that the dynamism of these regional economies is attributable to their increasing interdependencies. A community of US-educated Taiwanese engineers has coordinated a decentralized process of reciprocal industrial upgrading by transferring capital, skill, and know-how and by facilitating collaborations between specialist producers in the two regions. This case underscores the significance of technical communities and their institutions in diffusing ideas and organizing production at the global as well as the local level. This is a draft. Please do not cite or circulate without permission. Comments welcome. I would like to gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Jinn-yuh Hsu and the financial support of the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation. 
Silicon Valley in California and the Hsinchu-Taipei region of Taiwan are among the most frequently cited 'miracles' of industrialization in the information technology era. Since the region's transformation from an agricultural valley into the birthplace of the semiconductor industry in the 1950s, Silicon Valley firms have pioneered a wide range of technology-related industries. The regional economy has adapted flexibly to fast changing markets, and local producers continue to define the state-of-the-art in successive generations of technology-from semiconductor equipment, personal and handheld computers, and networking hardware and software, to biotechnology, multimedia software, and internet-related infrastructure and services.
Taiwan's technology achievements are more recent, but no less impressive. The Taipei area, which served as a source of low cost labor for consumer electronics production as late as the 1970s, is known today for the unparalleled speed and flexibility of its personal computer manufacturers. These firms dominate the markets for a large and growing range of computerrelated products, from motherboards and monitors to optical scanners and power supplies ( Figure   1 .) Meanwhile, the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park, established in 1980, is now a state-ofthe art manufacturer of semiconductors, on par with the world market leaders in the US and Japan (Figure 2 ). Taiwan's total IT output is now greater than that of larger nations like Korea; in fact it is larger than the output of Germany and France combined (Anderson, 1998.) The Silicon Valley and Hsinchu regions are differently specialized and remain at different levels of technological development. As a result, the dominant accounts of their success treat them in isolation. For some scholars, national economic success in information technology industries is evidence of the dynamism of free markets Lau, 1994; Gilder, 1989.) These accounts identify the high levels of human capital formation, domestic entrepreneurship, and market competition in either Taiwan or the US to explain the successes of their respective technology industries. Others argue that activist states are responsible for the successes. In this view, the intervention of agencies like the US Defense Department and Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) explain the dynamism of the new industries , Kraemer et. al., 1996 , Wade, 1990 , Harrison, 1994 , Borrus, 1989 It is clear, however, that these policy interventions differ fundamentally from those undertaken by the archetypal developmental states. In Taiwan government policy supports multiple players in any technology initiative, constantly putting competitive pressure on existing producers. The notebook PC consortium sponsored by ITRI's Computer and Communications Lab in 1990, for example, brought twenty new companies into the market (Ernst, 1998 .) Japanese consortia, by contrast, have tended to concentrate resources in the major firms and to reinforce market oligopoly . This is not to suggest that the public sector in Taiwan is less involved in industrial promotion than other East Asian nations, only that differences in their developmental strategies have important consequences for market structure. While policy makers in Japan and Korea typically target large established technology companies for promotion, in Taiwan they provide universal incentives to entire sectors. ITRI has thus organized ambitious technology transfer programs while simultaneously encouraging private investments in new firm formation and industrial upgrading. This contrast suggests the need to move beyond the simple state-market debate, which diverts attention away from other equally important determinants of industrial performance, such the organization of production (see, for example, Levy and Kuo's 1991 comparison of Taiwanese and Korean personal computer industries.)
Mounting evidence suggests the need to examine the organization of technology production-at both the local and the global levels-to account for the divergent fortunes of national industries. Scholars have recently documented, for example, the way that global corporations organize their supply chains, or international production networks, and the opportunities this provides for industrial upgrading in less advanced economies. The success of Taiwan's computer producers, from this view, derives from their role as original equipment manufacturers (OEM's) for the leading US personal computer companies-a relationship that stimulates knowledge creation, technology transfer, and improved domestic capabilities (Ernst, 1998 , Borrus, 1997 , Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998 1 These analyses represent an important conceptual advance. They demonstrate a significant mechanism for industrial upgrading in places like Taiwan, and one that is not reducible to arguments about the state or market. However most analyses of global production networks suggests that the growing sophistication of Taiwan's technological infrastructure is primarily attributable to its role as a supplier to foreign corporations. This focus on the sourcing strategies of multinational corporations overlooks the emergence of entrepreneurship and innovation in the periphery during the 1990s, particularly in places like Taiwan.
The connection between technology producers in the US and Taiwan is both more extensive and more decentralized than these top-down accounts suggest. The central and largely unrecognized actors in this process are a community of US-educated engineers who have built a social and economic bridge linking the Silicon Valley and Hsinchu economies. These highly skilled Taiwanese immigrants are distinguished from the broader Chinese Diaspora (or "overseas Chinese business networks") by shared professional as well as ethnic identities and by their integration into the technical communities of both technology regions.
The development of a transnational community-a community that spans borders and boasts as its key assets shared information, trust, and contacts (Portes, 1995) -has been largely overlooked in accounts of Taiwan's accelerated technological development. This paper argues that the contributions of this technical community have been the key to the successes of more commonly recognized actors: government policymakers and global corporations. Both state policies and OEM strategies rely heavily on the dense professional and social networks that keep Taiwan's policy-makers and producers close to the state-of-the-art technical knowledge and the leading edge markets in the US.
The development of a transnational technical community has also transformed the relationship between the Silicon Valley and Hsinchu economies. In the 1970s and 1980s, technology and capital resided in the US and were transferred to Taiwan, typically by multinational corporations seeking cheap labor. This one-way flow has given way in the 1990s to more decentralized two-way flows of skill, technology, and capital. The Silicon Valley-Hsinchu relationship today consists of formal and informal collaborations between individual investors and entrepreneurs, small and medium-sized firms, as well as the division of larger companies located on both sides of the Pacific. A new generation of venture capital providers and professional associations serve as intermediaries linking the decentralized infrastructures of the two regions. As a result, while Hsinchu is no longer a low-cost location, the region's producers continue to gain a growing share of global technology markets.
Technical Communities and Industrial Decentralization
A transnational community on this scale is only possible because of advances in communication and transportation technologies and changes in the structure of competition. In the 1960s and 1970s, the dominant competitors in the computer industry were vertically integrated corporations that controlled all aspects of hardware and software production. The rise of the Silicon Valley industrial model spurred the introduction of the personal computer and initiated a radical shift to a more fragmented industrial structure organized around networks of increasingly specialized producers (Bresnahan, 1998) .
Today, independent enterprises produce all of the components that were once internalized within a single large corporation-from application software, operating systems and computers to microprocessors and other components. The final systems are in turn marketed and distributed by still other enterprises. Within each of these horizontal segments there is, in turn, increasing specialization of production and a deepening social division of labor. In the semiconductor industry, for example, independent producers specialize in chip design, fabrication, packaging, testing, as well as different segments of the manufacturing materials and equipment sector. A new generation of firms has in turn emerged in the late 1990s that specializes in providing intellectual property in the form of design modules rather than the entire chip design. This change in industry structure appears as a shift to market relations. The number of actors in the industry has increased dramatically and competition within many (but not all) horizontal layers has increased as well. Yet this is far from the classic auction market mediated by price signals alone; the decentralized system depends heavily on the coordination provided by cross cutting social structures and institutions (Aoki, 1999) . While Silicon Valley's entrepreneurs innovate in increasingly specialized niche markets, intense communications in turn insure the speedy, often unanticipated, recombination of these specialized components into changing endproducts. This decentralized system provides significant advantages over a more integrated model in a volatile environment because of the speed and flexibility as well as the conceptual advances associated with the process of specialization and recombination. The deepening social division of labor in the industry creates opportunities for innovation in formerly peripheral regions-opportunities that did not exist in an era of highly integrated producers. The vertical specialization associated with the new system continually generates entrepreneurial opportunities. By exploiting these opportunities in their home countries, transnational entrepreneurs can build independent centers of specialization and innovation, while simultaneously maintaining ties to Silicon Valley to monitor and respond to fast-changing and uncertain markets and technologies. They are also well positioned to establish cross-regional partnerships that facilitate the integration of their specialized components into end products.
The social structure of a technical community thus appears essential to the organization of production at the global as well as the local level. In the old industrial model, the technical community was primarily inside of the corporation. The firm was seen as the privileged organizational form for the creation and internal transfer of knowledge, particularly technological know-how that is difficult to codify (Kogut and Zander, 1993) . In regions like Silicon Valley, where the technical community transcends firm boundaries, however, such tacit knowledge is often transferred through informal communications or the inter-firm movement of individuals.
This suggests that the multinational corporation may no longer be the advantaged or preferred organizational vehicle for transferring knowledge or personnel across national borders.
Transnational communities provide an alternative and potentially more flexible and responsive mechanism for long distance transfers of skill and know-how-particularly between very different business cultures or environments.
The Silicon Valley-Hsinchu connection is thus facilitated by the growing compatibility of the decentralized industrial structures of the two regions. Technology activity in both is highly localized (in the 50-mile industrial corridor linking Taipei to the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park in Taiwan, and its counterpart linking San Francisco to Palo Alto/San Jose in California.) Both regions boast high rates of indigenous entrepreneurship. In both, technology industry consists of thousands of specialized and fiercely competitive small and medium-sized enterprises as well as a handful of larger producers. And in both, local institutions and social networks support intense communications, informal collaboration, and collective learning across firm boundaries. It is striking that independent accounts of the performance of producers in these regions stress their flexibility, speed, and innovative capacity relative to their leading competitors in both the US and Asia (Ernst, 1998 , Saxenian, 1994 The remainder of this paper traces the evolution of the transnational community linking 
The "Brain Drain" and the Formation of a Taiwanese Technical Community in Silicon Valley
The modern "brain drain" from Asia to the US dates to the Immigration Act of 1965, often referred to as the Hart-Cellar Act. Prior to 1965 the US immigration system limited foreign entry by mandating extremely small quotas according to nation of origin. Hart-Cellar, by contrast, allowed immigration based on both the possession of scarce skills and on family ties to citizens or permanent residents. It also significantly increased the total number of immigrants allowed into the country. Taiwan, like most other Asian countries, was historically limited to a maximum of 100 immigrant visas per year. As a result, only 47 scientist and engineers immigrated to the US from Taiwan in 1965. Two years later, in 1967, the number had increased to 1,321 (Chang, 1992.) Taiwanese students came to the US by the thousands during the 1970s and 1980s, lured by the fellowship money available for graduate studies in engineering at US universities and pushed by the limited professional opportunities in Taiwan at the time. Taiwan sent more doctoral candidates in engineering to the US during the 1980s than any other country, including entire graduating classes from Taiwan's most elite engineering universities: National Taiwan University, National Chiao-Tung University, and Tsing-Hua University. Most stayed in the US after graduation, recognizing that there would be little demand for their skills back home.
Taiwanese policymakers complained bitterly at the time about losing their "best and brightest" to the US.
The influx of highly skilled immigrants coincided with the growth of a new generation of high technology industries in Silicon Valley. As the demand for technical skill in the emerging electronics industry exploded, it attracted recent graduates to the region. By 1990, one-third of all scientists and engineers in Silicon Valley's technology industries were foreign-born. Of those, almost two-thirds were Asian including 51% of Chinese origin, primarily from Taiwan (Saxenian, 1999.) Early Chinese immigrants to Silicon Valley saw themselves as outsiders to the region's mainstream technology community. While most held graduate degrees in engineering from US universities and worked for established technology companies, they often felt personally and professionally isolated. Some responded to this sense of exclusion by organizing collectively.
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They typically found one another socially first, coming together to celebrate holidays and family events. Over time, they turned the social networks to professional purposes, creating associations to provide resources and role models to assist the advancement of individuals within the community.
Old timers regard the Chinese Institute of Engineers (CIE) as the "grandfather" of the group of foreign-born CEOs was Indians, who were running 774 firms, or 7% of the total (Saxenian, 1999.) First-generation immigrants from Taiwan thus constructed a technical community in Silicon Valley, one that met both social and professional needs. This is not to suggest that they became a self-contained ethnic enclave. While many Taiwanese engineers socialize primarily with other Taiwanese immigrants and support one another when they start businesses, they also work closely with immigrants from other countries as well as with native-born engineers. There is growing recognition as well that while a start-up might be spawned with the support of ethnic networks, it must become part of the mainstream in order to grow. It appears that the most successful Chinese businesses in Silicon Valley today are those that draw on ethnic resources while simultaneously integrating into mainstream technology and business networks. 
The State and the Construction of a Transnational Community
Policymakers in Taiwan began to view US-educated engineers as a potential asset in the 1970s as they sought to upgrade the island's position in the international economy.
Drawing heavily on policy advice from overseas Taiwanese engineers, they developed strategies to upgrade the technological capabilities of the private sector and to promote new firm formation and competition in the emerging information technology industries. During the 1970s and 1980s, government agencies in Taiwan aggressively transferred state-of-the-art technology from the US, created a venture capital industry long before it became fashionable elsewhere in the world, and developed other measures to diffuse technology, including the formation of the Hsinchu ScienceBased Industrial Park. They also actively recruited Chinese engineers working in the US to return to Taiwan. CIE members in the US in turn identified appropriate Chinese engineers from industry or academia to travel to Taiwan to speak on the selected topics.
METS not only introduced up-to-date technologies to Taiwan but also helped to create personal and professional relationships between the engineers based in the two countries. Over time senior officials associated with science and technology agencies such as ITRI and the National Science Council (NSC), many of whom were also US-educated engineers, began attending the meetings as well. For example, K.T. Li, the Minister of Finance who is considered by many as the architect of Taiwan's technology strategy, was a regular METS attendee. 8 The overseas community was not only seen as source of up-to-date technical expertise but was also increasingly tapped for policy advice. With the help of their US advisors, ITRI selected RCA as a partner for the transfer of semiconductor technology. The process was designed to emphasize training as well as technology transfer and, as a result, helped form a network of engineers who subsequently played a key role in building Taiwan's semiconductor industry. In 1978 ITRI recruited 40 young engineers (35 from Taiwan and 5 from the US) and sent them to RCA for a year of training in chip design, process technology, and testing. After the US training was completed, the group returned to the Taiwan to run ERSO's newly constructed IC pilot production facility. Several of these trainees were classmates, having graduated from National Taiwan University in the late 1960s, and many went on to play key leadership roles at ERSO, ITRI and the local semiconductor industry. STAG also prevailed in defining a very ambitious and competitive approach to Taiwan's technological development-one that was strongly resisted by more technologically conservative forces within the state. They argued, successfully, that if Taiwan did not develop state-of-the-art technology, its small and medium-sized firms would be vulnerable to capture by the vertically integrated producers from Korea and Japan. This aggressive stance helped push Taiwan to develop leading edge manufacturing capabilities at an unprecedented pace. ITRI's promotion of the micro-computer industry in the 1980s, for example, paralleled that undertaken a decade earlier in the IC industry, including heavy reliance on outside technology and expertise.
The "foreign monks" also helped shape an industrial strategy that differed fundamentally from that of Taiwan's East Asian counterparts: one that limited direct state intervention in favor of reliance on the private sector and market opportunities. 14 In short, the unintended consequence of Taiwan's outward-looking technology policies was the creation of a transnational technical community-one that now has its own self-sustaining dynamic.
Institutionalizing the Silicon Valley-Hsinchu Connection
The accelerated growth of the Taiwanese I felt that at the time we were right in the throes of a huge change in the Valley in terms of what Chinese-Americans role could be. Many of us had worked hard and long as engineers, had managed to get to the point where we were either head of the company or a key member of the management team of a company. It was very clear that the Chinese American contribution can (sic) go far beyond engineering and scientific contribution into the business domain. . . what you need is a forum so that people can help each other, mentoring the younger generation, in terms of how to manage, how to run a business, how to get capital, and so on . . . At that time Taiwan was doing quite well . . . the economic miracle had created a lot of wealth so a two-way bridge was needed between here and Taiwan.
He went on to note that these ties could not have developed earlier because Taiwan 
Cross-Regional Collaborations and Industrial Upgrading
A community of Taiwanese returnees, astronauts, and US-based engineers has become the bridge between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu. What was once a one-way flow of technology and skill from the US to Taiwan has become a two-way thoroughfare allowing producers both regions collaborate to enhance distinctive but complementary strengths. Fred Cheng, who runs Winbond North America claims that: "The best way to start a technology company today is to take the best from each region, combining Taiwanese WI Harper distinguishes itself from its Sand Hill counterparts through its personal and professional ties with key management in Asia . . . In Asia it is very difficult to get good information, and through our established network of contacts we are in an excellent position to help the companies in which we invest . . . We see ourselves as the bridge between Silicon Valley and Asia. (Hellman, 1998) Ken Tai is a good example. Tai was a co-founder of Multitech, the forerunner of Acer, The new technology is all in Silicon Valley, but when you want to integrate that technology into a final product, Taiwan is the best place. Taiwan is the best place to integrate technology components together in a very efficient way because it excels at production logistics and information handling.
Tai goes on to describe InveStar's role as an intermediary in this process:
When we invest in Silicon Valley startups we are also helping bring them to Taiwan. It is relationship-building . . . we help them get high-level introductions to the semiconductor foundry and we help establish strategic opportunities and relationships in the PC sector as well. This is more than simply vendor-customer relationships. We smooth the relationships .23
The case of Platform Technology, a Silicon Valley start-up founded by a US-educated Chinese entrepreneur, Paul Tien, illustrates the benefits of the cross-Pacific relationships. 24 InveStar provided Platform with $3 m. in 1996 when the firm was already several years old and was struggling to find customers, in spite of its state-of-the-art audio chip design. The InveStar partners also introduced Tien to senior executives at the leading personal computer companies in Taipei. Platform became known within Taiwan's technology circles, and got so many design wins that it quickly became one of the world's largest producers of audio chips. Platform was also having problems with the manufacturing process at its foundry, TSMC. As a small US-based start-up they couldn't get the attention of the giant chip manufacturer. Once again, the InveStar partners intervened by called their friends at TSMC. They made sure that Platform's calls were returned and that its problems were addressed immediately.
One year later, Platform was so successful that it posed a major threat to ESS, another While Silicon Valley and Hsinchu remain at different levels of development and differently specialized, the interactions between the two regions are increasingly complementary and mutually beneficial. As long as the US remains the largest and most sophisticated market for technology products, which seems likely for the foreseeable future, new product definition and leading edge innovation will remain in Silicon Valley. However Taiwanese companies continue to enhance their ability to design, modify and adapt as well as rapidly commercialize technologies developed elsewhere. As local design and product development capabilities improve, Taiwanese companies are increasingly well positioned to take new product ideas and technologies from Silicon Valley and quickly integrate and produce them in high volume at relatively low cost.
Concluding Comments
The Taiwanese experience demonstrates that the social structure of a technical community is as important to organizing production at the global level as it is at the local level. Moreover it suggests that the multinational corporation is no longer the privileged vehicle for flows of knowledge or skill. A transnational technical community allows distant producers to specialize and collaborate to upgrade their capabilities, particularly when the collaborations require close and communications and joint-problem solving. The trust and local knowledge that exist within technical communities, even those that span continents, provide a competitive advantage in an environment where success depends on being fast to market. And rather than competing for a relatively fixed market, these specialists are jointly growing the market by continually introducing new products, services, and applications. As a result, while the relationships between producers in the two regions have deepened over time, they remain complementary and mutuallybeneficial rather than zero-sum.
The case also suggests that localization is not at odds with the globalization of economic activity. Rather they are mutually reinforcing. Globalization is increasingly a process of integration of specialized components through collaboration at an international level. This is best viewed as a process of recombination in which firms specialize in order to become global, and their specialization in turn allows them to be better collaborators. The best environments for breeding such specialist firms are the decentralized industrial systems of places like Silicon
Valley and Hsinchu. Just as the social structures and institutions within these region encourage entrepreneurship and learning at the regional level, so the creation of a transnational technical community facilitates collaborations between individuals and producers in the two regions and supports a mutually beneficial process of industrial upgrading. (Saxenian, 1999.) As governments around the world clamor to establish venture capital industries and technology parks in efforts to replicate the Silicon Valley experience, the Taiwanese case suggests that new centers of technology and entrepreneurship cannot be created in isolation.
Rather they require close and ongoing connections to the US market-often through integration into Silicon Valley's technical community. The Taiwanese case also suggests that regions seeking to participate in global technology networks should devote as much attention to expanding technical education and training, creating institutions to support new firm formation, and building ties to the Silicon Valley community as to luring foreign investment.
1 An OEM arrangement is one in which the brand name company (the customer) provides detailed technical blueprints and most components that allow the contractor (the supplier) to produce according to specifications. Observers site the shift to ODM (original design manufacturing) in Taiwan as evidence of industrial upgrading because the contractor takes on the responsibility for design and most component procurement as well. 2 It is possible to specialize without innovating, and it is possible to innovate without changing the division of labor. However it seems that the deepening social division of labor enhances the innovative capacity of a community: expanding opportunities for experimentation generate ideas, these ideas are in turn combined to make new ideas, and so forth in a dynamic and self-generating process. This suggests that specialization increases innovation and ultimately economic growth. 
